HOLDINGS: [1]-Pub. Util. Code, § 1759, applied to bar a putative class action against a public utility for deceptively representing to the California Public Utilities Commission and the public how much revenue it required to provide safe and reliable natural gas service because the action would interfere with the Commission’s exercise of its regulatory authority, given that ratemaking had long been an integral component of the Commission’s regulation and supervision of the utility’s natural gas operations, and the impact of the expenses to be incurred by the utility for gas transmission improvements as a result of the pipeline explosion at issue, as well as the relationship those expenses might bear to past natural gas rates and the utility’s past practices, remained a focus of the ongoing administrative proceedings initiated by the Commission in the explosion’s aftermath. Parties’ Los Angeles litigation lawyer appeal.
Outcome
Judgment affirmed.
Procedural Posture
Plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction enjoining defendant from using a similar mark, following plaintiff’s filing of an action for statutory trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C.S. § 1114, false designation of origin, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1125(a), dilution of a famous mark, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1125(c), and state unfair competition claims.
Overview
Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, a jeans manufacturer using a similar mark, for statutory trademark infringement, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1114, false designation of origin, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1125(a), dilution of a famous mark, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1125(c), state unfair competition, injury to business reputation, and dilution. The court determined that plaintiff had a strong likelihood of success on the merits of the trademark infringement claim because of the similarity between the parties’ logos. The three factors comprising an unfair competition claim all favored plaintiff. In addition, plaintiff’s likelihood of success on a claim of unfair competition based on trade dress infringement was high. Confusion of source was likely and plaintiff’s inability to control defendant’s product was inherent. The court found plaintiff was entitled to the presumption of harm because of the likelihood of success on the merits; therefore, plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction was granted.
Outcome
Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction was granted because plaintiff was entitled to the presumption of harm since the court found plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits of the trademark infringement action.
